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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY
We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral sys
tems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or
foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries
with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian elec
toral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with pro
portional representation systems.
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Серкан Кушукшенель, Осман Гюльсевен 
ВИБОРЧІ СИСТЕМИ І МІЖНАРОДНА ТОРГОВЕЛЬНА ПОЛІТИКА 
У статті розроблено просту теоретичну ігрову модель для аналізу взаємозв'язку між
виборчими системами і державною політикою у сфері торгівлі. Продемонстровано
міжнародний тиск різних закордонних лобігруп на остаточне рішення уряду щодо
торгової політики. В країнах з пропорційними виборчими системами торговельній
політиці притаманний більший протекціонізм, ніж в країнах з мажоритарними
системами. Більш того, в країнах з пропорційними виборчими системами вплив на
торговельну політику є для лобі дорожчим.
Ключові слова: виборча система; торговельна політика; лобі; моделювання; оптимум
Порето.
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ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЕ СИСТЕМЫ 
И МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ТОРГОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА
В статье разработана простая теоретическая игровая модель для анализа
взаимосвязи между избирательными системами и государственной политикой в сфере
торговли. Продемонстрировано международное давление различных иностранных лобби
групп на окончательное решение правительства по поводу торговой политики. В странах
с пропорциональными избирательными системами торговой политике присущ больший
протекционизм, чем в странах с мажоритарными системами. Более того, в странах с
пропорциональными избирательными системами влияние на торговую политику
обходится для лобби дороже.
Ключевые слова: избирательная система; торговая политика; лобби; моделирование;
оптимум Порето. 
1. Introduction. In democracies, governments shape trade policy in response to
not only the concerns of voters but also to lobbies pressure. Lobbies participate in
political process to influence the outcomes. Hence, governments' choice of the
implemented trade policy is affected by internal and external pressures. All parties in
government should balance these 2 affects because they need the public support,
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necessary for reelection, but they also need the financial contributions that come
from lobbies to finance everyday operations and campaign expenses.
As Grossman and Helpman (1994) stated, 2 different approaches are prominent
in the literature to explain the equilibrium in trade policy. The first one explicitly
models the political competition between candidates and lobbies. Lobbies try to affect
the outcome of elections by contributing to a party that promises the lobby more
favorable trade policy. In the second approach, elections are not considered and the
incumbent government maximizes the public support. For more on these different
approaches see Hillman (1989). Our approach is in spirit with the second approach.
We assume that there is an incumbent government in two different electoral systems
and governments care about both public support and foreign lobby contributions.
Mansfield et al. (2000) analyze the relationship between regime type and trade
policy. They find that aggregate trade barriers are lower within democratic pairs than
within pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy. Their argument depend on
a legislature with the power to ratify executive proposals which is assumed to be com
mon in democracies. However, they do not explain the reasons for different trade bar
riers within democracies.
In this paper, we present a simple theoretic game model that tries to capture the
reasons for different trade policies between democracies. We believe that electoral
systems are very important institutions in explaining this phenomenon. We label
democracies with 2 electoral systems: proportional representation systems and
majoritarian electoral systems. In the model, voters have singlepeaked preferences
on the tariff rate for an import good. We do not explicitly model the election process
but we assume that there is an incumbent government which is formed by one party
in the majoritarian electoral system and coalition of parties in the proportional
representation system. In both economies, government care about both the citizens
support and the monetary transfers from foreign lobbies. We assume that government
needs monetary transfers for well functioning. Moreover, we assume that all agents
are sincere. In both cases government has perfect information about the distribution
of voters' preferences. The government bargains with a foreign lobby on tariff rate. We
assume that the resulting outcome of the bargaining process is Pareto optimal, indi
vidually rational and symmetric. Then, we compare the equilibrium tariff rates and
amount of monetary transfers between the 2 electoral systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model for 2 different economies where economies are specified by their electoral sys
tems. Section 3 contains our main results which basically state that tariff rates will be
higher in proportional system. We conclude in Section 4 and discuss the implications
of the results, sensitivity of the model to changes in assumptions and possible exten
sions of the model.
2. The Model. The model presented here has much in common with the Mayer
(1984) and Kibris et al. (2003) framework. There is a finite set N of voters. Let
be a one dimensional trade policy (tariff rate) space. Each voter i N is assumed to
have singlepeaked preferences on the tariff rate for an import good. The preference
relation, Ri, is singlepeaked if there is                   , called the peak of Ri, such that for
all xi, yi in,   xi < yi < p(Ri) or xi > yi > p(Ri) implies yi Pi xi . We assume that voters
are not strategic so they are not aware of the bargaining process between lobby and
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government. Moreover, voters vote on tariff rate to declare to the government. We do
not specify the election process but we assume that there is an incumbent govern
ment. Since all voters' preferences are single peaked on a single dimension, the medi
an ideal tariff rate is a Condorcet winner and the social preference order under sim
ple majority rule is transitive, with median standing in the highest order [Black
(1948)]. Let tm >0 be median voter's ideal tariff rate.
In 2 party plurality systems, government is formed by one party. We are
implicitly using Duverger's law which states that the plurality rule for selecting the
winner of elections favors 2party system. The government's decision is affected by
public declaration which is median ideal tariff rate and a foreign lobby's most pre
ferred tariff rate. Let tf be the lobby's most preferred tariff rate which is lower than
that of median voter: 0 < tf < tm. 
The lobby grants favors in monetary terms to the government in return of a lower
tariff rate. Let M be the amount of monetary transfers. The government bargains with
the lobby on the tariff rate and amount of transfers. The government's utility function
may be written as: 
. (1)
Hence, the government does not want to set tariff rate further from median ideal
point unless it is compensated by the monetary transfers. The monetary transfers are
not allocated to the voters. We assume that the transfers are necessary for wellfunc
tioning of the government or these are side transfers to the government. If we incor
porate the allocation part to the model, we should assume that voters are sophisti
cated and as a result this process will increase the median voter's ideal tariff rate.
In proportional representation system, we know that party system is fragmented
and there are usually more parties than those that elect by plurality or majority. As
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) stated, coalition of many parties make systematically
different policy choices than single party governments. We do not model the coalition
formation process but we assume that government consists of a large party and a small
party. For more on coalition formation in proportional representation systems see
AustenSmith and Banks (1988). Let        be the median ideal point of voters who sup
port the large party and      be the median ideal point of voters who support the small
party. The members' utility function of coalitional government may be written as follows:
, (2)
. (3)
We assume that                                 and weight of the large party in the coalition
is α such that                                . The monetary transfer the large party receives is
proportional to its weight (or percentage of cabinet posts hold by the large party).
Schofield and Laver (1985) show that approximately half of European coalition gov
ernments between 1945 and 1983 contain 2 parties and in most of the coalitions
median party is not in the coalition. Hence, we believe that these assumptions are
intuitively desirable.
The foreign lobby's preferences may be written as follows:
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Basically we assume that the tariff rates lower than tf do not make the lobby worse
off but lower rates do not make the lobby better off. Hence,  tf is the most preferred
tariff rate of the foreign lobby. The second term (M) summarizes the monetary bene
fits the lobby grants to the government.
In both electoral systems, the internal structure of the bargaining process
between government and the foreign lobby is not specified. However, we assume that
the outcome of bargaining between government and the lobby is Pareto optimal, indi
vidually rational and symmetric. Hence, the lobby and government have equal bar
gaining power and we use Nash bargaining solution concept. For more on this con
cept see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). In proportional representation system, we
use asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in which the ideal tariff rate of government
is determined proportional to the weights of 2 parties in the government. Hence, the
ideal tariff rate for coalitional government is                           .
3. The Main Results. Our main result provides a comparison of implemented
tariff rates and monetary transfers in different electoral systems.
Theorem: In the systems of proportional representation (PR), the implemented
tariff rate            at equilibrium will be larger than the tariff rate (t*) in those that elect
by majority rule (SMD). Moreover, foreign lobbies transfer relatively more money to
coalition governments.
Proof: From Pareto optimality, t* will satisfy the tangency condition,
(5)
Therefore,                     In PR, government's ideal point is                                          .
By Pareto optimality,
(6)
which implies t* < t*PR . Given t* , by individual rationality the lobby receives its dis
agreement payoff at Mmax and the government receives its disagreement payoff at Mmin,
where Mmax = (tm – tf)2 – (t* – tf)2 > 0, and Mmin = (tm – t*)2 > 0 . Since we assume that
the government and the lobby have equal bargaining power, the bargaining process
leads to the transfer M* where:
(7)
In PR, by individual rationality:
(8)
Therefore, M*PR > M*. 
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4. Conclusion. This model tries to capture the reasons for different macroeco
nomic policies around the world. Our results suggest institutions might be an impor
tant factor in explaining these differences. We show that tariff rates will be higher in
countries with proportional representation systems than those with majoritarian ones.
The predictions of our model are also consistent with the empirical results. An empiri
cal study by Rogowski and Kayser (2002) shows that prices of goods and services are
higher in PR countries after controlling for other variables. Higher tariff rates imply
goods at home country will be expensive since producers are protected from foreign
competition and they can charge close to monopoly prices.
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